Philosophy of Science

This section pertains to a small-but-crucial part of philosophy of science: how can the evolution of good scientific theory be improved? First, what is a "good theory." Is a theory good if it agrees with all experimental evidence and accuractly predicts phenomena? Such a theory is very useful for applied science and probably in other ways. But it can have a harmful effect if it causes misunderstandings of nature. Such misunderstandings have occurred in the past, and this website shows that modern physics theory probably includes fundamental misunderstandings of nature.

History

For about 1500 years, Ptolemy's geocentric theory of the universe, was of great value in one respect because it could accurately predict the positions of heavenly bodies and the times and locations of eclipses and other celestial events. The agreement between the theory's mathematics and the observed phenomena appeared to be strong evidence that the Ptolemaic model was an accurate representation of nature. The theory was complimentary with the belief that heavenly bodies were comprised of heavenly matter which was unlike matter on earth. Heavenly matter had a natural tendency to move in circular paths in the heavens. Although this geocentric model appeared correct, was useful, and satisfied people's desire to understand the cosmos, it was also a very misleading model of nature and it detered the advancement of better theories and contributed to Earth-centered myths and slowed the advancement of human awareness.

This website shows that relativity theory is probably a modern counterpart of Ptolemy's theory because both theories are based on misleading evidence that results in misleading conclusions about nature. Surely this claim sounds preposterous to readers who are not familiar enough with the quantum medium view to understand its agreement with all related observed phenomena including important phenomena that relativity theory cannot explain, such as the inertia of mass/energy and constant light speed, c. The qm view videos and the qmview.net website permit an understanding of the qm view sufficient to determine that the qm view's equations predict exactly the same observed phenomena that special relativity theory predicts and the same observed phenomena that general relativity predicts except they do not predict the event horizons and singularities of black holes, or the possibility of traveling back in time to change the course of history.

Characteristics of good scientific theory

Agreement with all experimental evidence and other observations
If relativity theory and the qm view both agree with the experimental evidence and predict essentially the same phenomena, how can it be determined which theory might be correct? Isn't it important to determine which is more likely to be correct because they are fundamentally different views of nature and because it is important not to believe a fundamentally incorrect view of nature? And the determination could affect the course of related scientific investigations and the expenditures of public or private funds to support the investigations. What criteria can be used to determine which theory is more plausible?

Simplicity
A commonly suggested criterion is simplicity. Of course simplicity is desirable if a theory can be made simple. Copernican theory is not simple because it involves complex phenomena. Planet orbits are elliptical, not circular as Copernicus thought, and the orbits all differ in their ellipticity. Widespread acceptance of the theory was slowed because the theory raised questions that could not be answered. For example, what keeps the planets on their orbits? The answer is complex, and we still do not have a complete answer. Kepler helped answer the question 50 years after Copernicus introduced the theory, and Newton added to the explanation and complexity 100 years later. In the 20th century general relativity added curved spacetime to the answer. The qm view sheds further light on this question. It shows that spacetime is an unnecessary complication. Although simplicity is desirable, there is abundant evidence that it is not a good indication of a correct view of nature.

It is debatable whether relativity or the qm view is more complex. The mathematics of the qm view are simple compared to general relativity, and the qm view is probably much easier to understand because it does not have the counterintuitive and confusing aspects of relativity. People have pointed out that the qm view requires a medium and relativity does not. This is true, but the quantum medium is probably the same physical entity as the quantum vacuum required by quantum mechanics theory, in which case there is a consilience between the two theories. The qm view also has a consilience with the long-accepted view that space and time are fundamentally different aspects of nature, aspects that relativity replaces with spacetime.

Sound Assumptions
Certainly good theories need to rest on sound assumptions. The constant light speed, c, assumption of relativity theory is a questionable assumption because no one has been able to explain why the speed of light can be constant relative all observers who are in constant velocity motion relative to one another. The qm view website and videos explain why c is the constant virtual speed of light, the illusion that photons always have the same speed relative to sources and observers of the light. This illusion is one of many remarkable logical consequences of the quantum medium through which photons are propagated at a constant absolute speed, ca, and therefore have absolute speeds, cr, relative to the observers that depend on the velocities of the observers through the quantum medium.

Logical Conclusions
Good theories should result in logical conclusions. Relativity theory leads to the conclusion that our universe has no absolute distances, times or masses because observers moving relative one another cannot agree on the distances, times, and masses they observe. The qm view shows clearly that the observers cannot agree because the observers have different physical standards of distance, time, and mass in their systems. The different physical standards are an interesting logical consequence of the systems' different velocities through the medium. The qm view permits all observers to convert their physical standards into the absolute standards for a system at rest in the quantum medium and consequently be in complete agreement on observed distances, times, and masses. Relativity theory also results in paradoxes that are explained by the qm view.

Ability to Explain Phenomena
Good theories should be able to explain the causes of the phenomena they predict; the more kinds of phenomena a theory predicts and explains the better. Newton's laws are mathematical relationships and statements that have been of great value because they accurately describe and predict a variety of important observed phenomena. Newton recognized that the mathematics and statements did not explain the causes of the phenomena. Similarly, the mathematics of relativity theory accurately agree with and predict observed phenomena. The qm view explains clearly the phenomena predicted by both Newton's laws and relativity theory in terms of logical physical causes, as this website shows. This is strong evidence that the qm view is correct. The qm view explains why relativity theory accurately predicts observed relativistic phenomena that appear to be caused by the relative motion between the observer and the phenomena. It explains why the relative-motion explanation for the phenomena leads to the paradoxes that people have tried to explain in various other ways. The following may make this clearer.

The qm view and relativity theory both agree that when two identical clocks, each with an observer, are moving relative to one another, each observer will observe that the other clock is evolving slower than his or her clock, a situation that seems impossible. Relativity theory attributes this strange symmetry of observations to the relative motion between the clocks.

In the qm view the rates at which the clocks evolve, the standards of distance, and the speeds of light in the clocks' reference frames depend on the motions of the reference frames through the quantum medium. The clocks' rates of time will differ unless the clocks have the same speed through the quantum medium. Remarkably, regardless of the clocks' speeds through the medium, the many physical changes caused by the clocks' motions through the quantum medium always combine to produce exactly the same observed phenomena and symmetry predicted by relativity theory. The symmetry of the virtual phenomena, observed by people who assume constant light speed, c, is an illusion. Presumably people who understand how the qm view explains the observed phenomena in terms of logical physical causes will consider this ability additional evidence that the qm view is correct.

Current need for good Philosophy of Science

We have discussed some of the significant indicators of a theory's soundness, showing that agreement with experimental evidence is just the first of a variety of characteristics good theories need to have. Had these criteria been used to assess Ptolemy's theory over the centuries of its prominence, it might have hastened widespread acceptance of better theory. It would have raised doubts about the theory's assumption that heavenly matter tends to move in circular paths. It would have shown the need for a more plausible explanation for the phenomena. Perhaps satisfaction with the theory due to its usefulness made people less inclined to question the theory.

People satisfied with modern physics theories seem either unaware or unconcerned that the theories may be causing misleading ideas about nature. There appears to be little concern in the physics community that current orthodox theory cannot explain so much important observed phenomena such as evidence that photons sometimes appear to be particles and sometimes appear to be waves, and that their speed is somehow constant relative to all observers. This human tendency to overlook the weaknesses in our theories and beliefs slows the advancement of human awareness.

Scientists, like people involved in politics and other professions, can become so focused on their own ideas and so certain in their thinking that they cannot imagine being wrong. Groups of people all thinking the same way tend to create this certainty. Certainty is usually a more comfortable mental state than uncertainty. People who are certain about what they know can take pride in what they know. The certainty makes it difficult to change their thinking, even when their thinking is clearly in error. This is reflected in the proverb, "A man convinced against his will, is of the same opinion still."

Surely the advancement of science is slowed when the conventional wisdom says there is no need to consider alternative theories because orthodox theory is correct inasmuch as it agrees with experimental evidence and has withstood the test of time and is considered sound by textbooks and most physicists. This way of thinking limits the opportunity for a plausible alternative theory, such as the qm view, to be understood, evaluated on its merits, and lead to new science beyond the scope of orthodox theory.

Encouraging good Philosophy of Science

It is hard to see the rationale for Richard Feynman's remark that "Philosophy of Science is about as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds." I can understand why people busy with experimental and theoretical physics can think that philosophy has little practical value in their work. And perhaps it has little, short-term practical value in applied physics or for physics professors and students trying to teach and learn what is known.

Physics is certainly of great practical value with or without philosophy of science. But isn't it of much greater value with good philosophy of science? It helps bring the needed, realistic humility into the field of physics. It helps keep aware of Newton's "great ocean of truth" which still lays mostly undiscovered before us, rather than focusing narrowly on what we know and thinking we are on the verge of a "theory of everything," as some believe. Possibly a century from now physicists will look back and see deficiencies in our modern physics theories comparable to the deficiencies we see in theories popular several centuries ago. Doesn't it make physics more interesting to realize how much we don't know about our universe and how much our awareness can improve if we keep searching? Knowing can preclude learning, as many have pointed out.

A sign in the woodworking shop in our elementary school said, "A smart boy knows he isn't." Perhaps this sign should appear in more places. Surely we can all think of places in need of this sign. The history of science shows that science is crucial for improving human awareness, and also that scientific theories need to be constantly questioned because they may be wrong in some way. It probably helps all people to have a realistic awareness of the uncertainties of their knowledge and beliefs, or at least not have an unrealistic certainty.

Isn't it true that people who have a realistic uncertainty of their knowledge are in a much more searching state of mind than people who are certain of their knowledge? This searching state of mind increases their chances of improving their awareness. Isn't it particularly important for scientists to keep aware of the uncertainty of their knowledge and the fallibility of their thinking because scientists have the best opportunities to improve the awareness of everyone? They have the best tools for investigating phenomena and the best opportunities to share ideas and other information.

History shows that science is a powerful tool that leads to great changes in human abilities and thinking. This tool can be used in many ways. It can be used for good purposes such as making life better for people, or bad purposes that make life worse for others. It is difficult to understand how anyone can think it is not essential that careful thought be given to how science is conducted and used. Isn't this careful thought philosophy of science?